SECRET//REL ISAF
STATE OF THE TALIBAN
JANUARY 6, 2012
DETAINEE PERSPECTIVES
A summary of reflections on the current state of the insurgency,
ISAF operational effectiveness, external influences shaping the
Taliban, and their views on ending the war and moving forward.
TF-3-10 BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
Overview
This document is intended to provide a unique view of the Afghan
insurgency, one which is derived from the insurgents themselves. It is a
reflection of the most common themes emerging from interrogations and
debriefmgs in Afghanistan in 201 1. Throughout the year, TF 3-10
conducted over 27,000 interrogations of over 4,000 Taliban, Al Qaeda,
foreign fighters and civilians. As this document is derived directly from
insurgents, it should be considered informational and not necessarily
analytical.
The removal of key insurgents from the battlefield is an essential
element of the TF 3-10 mission. As a direct result of rapport-based
approaches used during subsequent interrogations, detainees provide a
wide range of targetable information. However, in addition to names and
locations, detainees offer thousands of personal anecdotes, insight into
insurgent strategies and tactics, reflections on local attitudes, sources of
recruitment and motivation, views on reconciliation , and observations
on the effectiveness of both the International Security Assistance Force
and GIRoA.
The year 201 1 was pivotal for the Afghan insurgency, as Al Qaeda's
regional influence continues to dissipate. The death of Al Qaeda leader
Usama bin Laden was a resounding success for the international
community, yet his elimination remains only another milestone in the
ongoing, relentless degradation of the world's foremost terrorist network.
Al Qaeda's ability to operate effectively has been further restricted by the
deaths of Sheikh Said al Masri, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Mohammad
Khan and scores of other experienced personnel.
The year also brought unprecedented international media attention to
the Government of Pakistan's persistent and fundamental role in the
Afghan insurgency. Pakistan's response to the Abbottabad raid publicly
exposed its inability to control international militants within its borders,
and provided the world a glimpse into the widespread support among
their population for extremist groups. Reflections from detainees indicate
that Pakistan's manipulation of Taliban senior leadership continues
unabatedly. The Taliban themselves do not trust Pakistan, yet there is a
widespread acceptance of the status quo in lieu of realistic alternatives.
In the last year there has been unprecedented interest, even from
GIRoA members, in joining the insurgent cause. Afghan civilians
frequently prefer Taliban governance over GIRoA, usually as a result of
government corruption, ethnic bias and lack of connection with local
religious and tribal leaders. The effectiveness of Taliban governance
allows for increased recruitment rates which, subsequently, bolsters their
ability to replace losses.
Taliban commanders, along with rank and file members, increasingly
believe their contol of Afghanistan is inevitable. Though the Taliban
suffered severely in 201 1, its strength, motivation, funding , and tactical
proficiency remains intact. While they are weary of war, they see little
hope for a negotiated peace. Despite numerous tactical setbacks,
surrender is far from their collective mindset. For the moment, they
believe that continuing the fight and expanding Taliban governance are
their only viable courses of action.
Strategic Developments
Since 2010, Taliban strategic messaging has focused increasingly on
redefining the Taliban "Emirate" as a legitimate government. Taliban
moderates, including Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and its Media
Committee Chairman, Emir Khan Mutaki, have made a concerted
attempt to accomplish this. Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, a
relative moderate and reputed pragmatist, serves as the Taliban's deputy
commander, directly subordinate only to Mullah Mohammad Omar.
Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, an ardent, if occasionally irrational
commander, who was once a contender for this position, heads Taliban
military operations.
The Taliban has widened its existing base of popular support within
Afghanistan, and begun offering some reassurance to the international
community that they are capable of rational and progressive leadership.
Taliban leaders, including Mullah Mohammad Omar, have publicly
related a somewhat clearer and more consistent vision for a future
Taliban government in Afghanistan, one which ostensibly advocates
acceptance of all Afghan ethnic groups and distances the group from
international extremism. However, even senior detainees acknowledge
that this will remain a difficult message to sell.
In order to overcome widespread skepticism, Taliban leaders are
beginning to more freely acknowledge that, if given the opportunity, they
would attempt to avoid past mistakes, both domestic and diplomatic.
While the validity of this assertion is certainly questionable, the
fundamental message is beginning to resonate among the Afghan
population. Regulating the behavior of Taliban personnel is a critical
element of this message. In 201 1, the Taliban have limited acts of
brutality. In order to minimize civilian deaths, commanders now
coordinate with village elders to determine the placement of mines.
Commanders also work with civilians to explain future offensive
operations, and even request permission to transit through certain areas.
The Taliban La'iha, or code of conduct, is designed specifically to
maintain control of Taliban ranks and limit the possibility of rogue
elements. The La'iha serves as a guide for promoting close relationships
between Taliban commanders and local civilian leaders. The code is
strictly enforced, with an elaborate system of checks and balances to
insure compliance. Through the use of neutral observers and judges who
report only to higher-level commanders, the Taliban leadership quickly
identifies issues and replaces leaders. In rare cases, Taliban leaders have
already gone as far as to expel or imprison their own members for
violations.
Efforts toward moderation appear to be part of an attempt to hasten the
withdrawal of ISAF personnel. It remains to be seen whether a
revitalized, more progressive Taliban will endure if they continue to gain
power and popularity. Regardless, at least within the Taliban, the
refurbished image is already having a positive effect on morale. As
opposed to years past, detainees have become more confident in not only
their potential to win, but the virtue of their cause. Detainees from
throughout Afghanistan report that popular support for the insurgency, in
terms of recruitment and donations, increased within the last year.
The Taliban leadership controls nearly all insurgent activity in
Afghanistan. Outside groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and others must receive permission from Taliban leaders
prior to conducting operations on Afghan territory. Despite public
statements suggesting distance between Taliban and international
extremists, no formal split has yet occurred. However, many within the
Taliban appear prepared to enforce a separation from these groups,
should they receive orders from the Taliban Central Shura in Quetta,
Pakistan.
Many Afghans are already bracing themselves for an eventual return of
the Taliban. GIRoA continues to declare its willingness to fight, yet
many of its personnel have secretly reached out to insurgents, seeking
long-term options in the event of a possible Taliban victory. The Taliban
recognize this trend and formalized a reconciliation system of their own.
In 201 1, the Taliban substantially altered their internal guidance and
strategic information operations messaging to encourage GIRoA
personnel to switch sides.
A point of continued frustration for Taliban leaders is their inability to
independently negotiate an early end to the conflict. Pakistan continues
to monitor, manipulate and direct Taliban interaction with outside
entities. Safe havens provided by Pakistan are juxtaposed with their
willingness to immediately arrest any Taliban personnel deemed
uncooperative. Many Taliban members believe that neither Pakistan nor
GIRoA are willing to allow a peaceful end of the war, and therefore
forsake the considerable material gains to be garnered from the conflict.
Even senior Taliban leaders are fearful that they will be pressed from
each side to continue the fight indefinitely.
How the Taliban Government Works
In the last two years, the Taliban leadership continued to refocus from
military operations to the establishment of alternative civilian
governance. The Taliban have recognized that the public has been
dissatisfied with GIRoA for many years, but with no ability to act as a
substitute and little control over subordinate personnel, they could not
generate widespread support among the population. While Taliban
military operations continue to gain media attention, their growing ability
to provide essential governmental services has become a strong source of
appeal for Afghans.
The Taliban believe that Islam is the most unifying factor in the
country and therefore base their concept of governance on Islamic
principles. Even in modern Afghanistan, decisions appearing to be based
in Islamic law may not be questioned. In mediating tribal, personal and
criminal disputes, the Taliban will not accept money. Local villagers
report a surprising degree of satisfaction with Taliban decrees.
Conversely, favorable GIRoA judicial rulings tend to require bribes,
which many simply cannot afford. Taliban personnel often work closely
with local leaders in order to minimize the appearance of outside
intrusion. There is a widespread belief in Afghanistan that a highly
centralized government established by foreigners will always be
fundamentally unwelcome and incapable of long-term success.
The Taliban first gained popularity in Kandahar in approximately 1 994
when, in the midst of the post-communist civil war and widespread
lawlessness, they offered stability and justice. Mullah Mohammad Omar
was well-liked in Kandahar because he was perceived to be strict but fair
under Islamic law. Many from that area, including some who were not
supporters of the pre-2001 Taliban government, acknowledge that the
early Taliban began as proponents of local people who had been
disenfranchised or otherwise mistreated by the ruling warlords.
However, as the Taliban expanded in the mid- 1 990s, newer and
younger recruits began to abuse their power, enforcing regulations more
on personal whim than Islamic jurisprudence. Flagrant excess and
abuses, as well as corruption of other forms, became commonplace.
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (known colloquially as
ISI) and foreign extremist elements increasingly appeared to manipulate
the Taliban leadership. Popular support inevitably dwindled to the point
that, even in centers of early support for the Taliban, Afghan civilians
welcomed the arrival of coalition forces in 2001.
Since then, however, the Taliban government has developed
widespread appeal by returning to simple, values-based administration
with overlapping systems of checks and balances to ensure at least the
appearance of incorruptibility. The Taliban have achieved this through
their civilian commission system, which is designed to provide local,
Sharia-based government, unbiased mediation, judicial systems free of
corruption, as well as an independent voice for civilians who have issues
with the Taliban military command.
"Because I am a religious leader, the Taliban
use me as a conduit to local villagers. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], Taliban-associated
village imam, Helmand Province [photo
redacted]
For most rural Afghan civilians, these are the only government services
necessary to maintain order.
Civilian commissioners are chosen for their impartiality and local
respectability, by leaders who are echelons above local Taliban military
commanders. Most are religiously trained, though some are chosen
simply because they are esteemed local leaders. Taliban leaders are
directed under the La'iha to incorporate local religious and tribal leaders
into any decision-making process. With inclusion and backing of local
leaders, even severe punishments are often supported.
One of the strengths of the civilian commission system is its flexibility.
Taliban provincial governors are free to establish a civilian commission
system which suits the needs of their assigned province. Guidance from
the Taliban leadership insures only that the civilian commissioners
operate independently of the military leadership. How the system is
implemented can be easily adapted to the needs of the region or tribe in
question.
"The commission comes into Paktika
Province every summer, to ask
villagers their opinions on Taliban
in the area. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], Taliban
commander, Paktika Province
A shura-level commission system, based in Quetta, Pakistan, maintains
teams of specifically-designated personnel who travel throughout
Afghanistan speaking with locals, eliciting complaints against the
Taliban leadership, and mediating any disagreements between the
Taliban themselves. This is designed to insure that the provincial
governor does not intentionally manipulate the system for the benefit of
himself or his subordinate commanders.
In the event that the district, provincial or Taliban central civilian
commission system fails, the Taliban leadership has now distributed
phone numbers throughout Afghanistan, which can be used to
anonymously inform Taliban leaders of internal issues involving
corruption, brutality, misdirected military operations or an inability to
solve local criminal, tribal or regional issues.
An independent team investigates each complaint and reports directly
to the Taliban Central Shura. Civilians have reported their satisfaction
with the system. Scores of accounts from across Afghanistan, from
Taliban and civilians alike, describe situations in which Taliban military
commanders were rapidly replaced, expelled or even jailed for trespasses
against locals. Tribal elders have reportedly informed Taliban
commanders that, as long as the Taliban continues to work with locals in
this manner, they can be assured of long-term local support.
Why the Taliban Fight
The Taliban believe that President Karzai and his allies will
deliberately perpetuate the war, in order to further disenfranchise the
Pashtun population and capitalize on the influx of international
resources. Much of GIRoA is made up of Northern Alliance leaders and
former communists of the Najibullah era, some of whom were once
considered war criminals even among the international community. The
Taliban regularly exploit this, as a means of characterizing GIRoA as
anti-Islamic and ethnically biased.
Taliban personnel believe that GIRoA is incapable of garnering
sufficient popular support to effectively administer Afghanistan. They
believe that a government based in Islamic values and free of foreign,
liberal or secular influence is seen as the only viable option for
maintaining a stable society.
"When the Karzai government was
established, we all thought there was a
chance for something good. The
harassment, the corruption and the abuse
are unbearable. We chose to fight. We
chose the Taliban. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], senior Taliban
commander, Helmand Province
Taliban leaders, and a large number of Afghan civilians, view the current
Afghan constitution as a perplexing and contradictory document,
designed to centralize power in Kabul rather than promote Islamic
values.
In Afghanistan, the term "liberal values" often equates to civil-war-era
lawlessness and chaos, sexual permissiveness and a promotion of
secularism. Even relative moderates equate the term "democracy" to
liberal, Western values. Democracy, education, religious tolerance , and
women's rights were all common Soviet propaganda themes during the
1979-1989 occupation.
Whether it is accurate or not, there is a persistent view that any goal
promoted by the Soviet Union was simply part of an overall effort to
undermine Islam itself. Such themes are largely dismissed in Afghanistan
as being concerns of the "red faces," as the British, Russians and
Americans are commonly labeled. Ignorance and misunderstandings
among the Afghan population are commonplace. However, combined
GIRoA/ ISAF efforts to educate the public on the true definition or
societal value of democracy, secularism, tolerance, liberal values and
women's rights have tended, thus far, to be disregarded outright.
Western concepts of women's rights remain widely rejected, at least
publicly, by the majority of the Afghan population, though the Taliban
themselves are divided on the issue. For example, the Taliban leadership
does not yet officially support education for girls, yet there has always
been a regional public girls' school located immediately within the
Haqqani Madrassa, the headquarters for the Haqqani Network.
Traditional roles of women, including the wearing of the burqa, predate
Islam and are thoroughly entrenched in rural Afghan society. "Protecting
our traditional values" continues to be a powerful insurgent theme. This
message resonates at nearly every level of society, even crossing
boundaries between historically acrimonious ethnic lines. The Afghan
capital is a singular exception to this rule. Although, in private
conversations, Afghans commonly confide that "Kabul women are not
Afghan." Most Afghan tribal leaders appear to agree with the Taliban
that Western-style women's rights will lead to a degradation of society.
Many others believe that the acceptance of women's rights is no less than
a blatant contradiction of Islam, which in itself is an admirable reason to
wage jihad.
The Taliban will not accept any government which is perceived to
exclude the Pashtuns, who constitute the largest tribe among the Afghan
population. GIRoA corruption, abuse of power and suspected lack of
commitment to Islam continue to provoke significant anti-government
sentiment. The Taliban will be hostile to any government which appears
to act as an agent of foreign powers to instill Western values. The
Taliban do not fight for financial gain. The eventual overthrow of GIRoA
remains their primary motivator.
Pakistan's Role in the Conflict
The Government of Pakistan remains intimately involved with the
Taliban. In the opinion of Taliban personnel, a primary mission of ISI is
to insure that Pakistan-based militant groups' activities remain externally
directed. Pakistan remains fundamentally opposed to GIRoA. Hamid
Karzai is perceived as deeply influenced by India, Iran and the West, and
therefore a potential strategic threat to Pakistani security. Most detainees
believe that Pakistan will continue to overlook any concerns with
Afghan-focused insurgent groups, in order to undermine GIRoA.
Reflections from detained senior leaders consistently indicate that until
the Taliban returns to Afghanistan they will have little choice but to
endure Pakistan's control.
Senior Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI personnel who advise
on strategy and relay any pertinent concerns of the Government of
Pakistan. These meetings are secretive, and although they are widely
rumored among insurgents to take place, only the highest-level detainees
have reported firsthand access to ISI personnel. Even in these instances,
detainees are fearful of providing specific details, primarily due to the
prospect of intelligence leaks, which could prompt an ISI-instigated
backlash against them and their families in Pakistan.
In meetings with Taliban leaders, ISI personnel are openly hostile to
ISAF and the government of Afghanistan. ISI officers tout the need for
continued jihad and expulsion of "foreign invaders" from Afghanistan.
When Taliban personnel are imprisoned in Pakistan, the arrest is blamed
on U.S. pressure or intervention. These incidents are subsequently used
to motivate Taliban personnel into amplifying the conflict in
Afghanistan.
Taliban personnel, from low-level fighters to commanders, describe the
Government of Pakistan with remarkable consistency as "untrustworthy,"
"manipulative," "controlling," "demeaning," and fundamentally
"indifferent to the interests of Afghanistan." There is a widespread belief
that, despite their professed support, ISI has no intention of allowing the
Taliban to end the war and return to Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership
is aware of Pakistan's historic duplicity. Most believe that the
Government of Pakistan is also conscious of Taliban suspicion and
resentment.
"Pakistan knows everything. They
control everything. I can 't piss on a
tree in Konar [Province] without
them watching. The Taliban are not
Islam. The Taliban are Islamabad. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], Al Qaeda
commander, Konar Province, [photo
redacted]
There is a widespread assumption that Pakistan will never allow the
Taliban the chance to become independent of ISI control, and thereby
risk a potentially hostile organization turning against them in the future.
Some Taliban commanders have openly threatened to do just that, in the
event that they return to power in Afghanistan, but they have been
suppressed or privately chastised by Taliban senior leaders, in an effort
to keep the peace.
Despite widespread open-source reports to the contrary, detainees have
provided little evidence of direct ISI funding of Taliban operations or
training of Taliban personnel. Similarly, there have been no credible
reports from detainees in 201 1 of ISI directly providing weapons to the
Taliban. Rather, the majority of ISI support appears to be through
intermediaries.
The Taliban utilizes a wide array of ISI-sponsored Punjabi militant
groups in North Waziristan Agency and Baluchistan to provide
electronics expertise, remote detonators, advanced explosives, mines and
suicide vests. These groups were originally created and funded by ISI to
operate in Kashmir against India until the post-9/1 1 era, when they were
declared international terrorists and officially disbanded. The Kashmiri
training camps for these groups were abruptly shut down at that time, but
their personnel quickly relocated to regions along the Afghan border in a
renewed role as support elements to the Taliban.
Pakistani Army Border Checkpoint
Where Taliban personnel report
stopping for "tea and snacks " with
border guards, as they transit into
Afghanistan to fight:
[Satellite Map Redacted]
//[redacted]//
North Waziristan Agency, PK
ISI maintains consistent and direct influence within many of these
Punjabi groups since they were disbanded and dispersed. It remains
unclear, at least from detainee reporting, to what extent ISI directly
provides them with funds. As with most ISI influence, control is wielded
by simply allowing such groups to operate, accumulate materiel, recruit
personnel and conduct operations unhindered.
Retired ISI director Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul has long served as a liaison to
a wide variety of militant groups in Pakistan, many of which focus
exclusively on conducting operations in Afghanistan. Detainees have
noted that Hamid Gul has always had an integral role in Taliban affairs,
since his presence at the Taliban's formal inception in Pakistan in 1994.
Taliban personnel consistently dismiss the possibility that certain ISI
elements or individuals could act independently of official Pakistani
guidance. Hamid Gul directly represents the Government of Pakistan in
meetings with the Taliban.
ISI is thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all
senior Taliban personnel. The Haqqani family, for example, resides
immediately west of the ISI office at the airfield in Miram Shah,
Pakistan. The ISI office in Thai, Pakistan, is located on a bluff
overlooking the headquarters of another Taliban organization, the
Mansur Group. Senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin
Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI
headquarters in Islamabad, Pakistan.
ISI is particularly alert to any contact between Taliban personnel and
other groups or organizations, including GIRoA or other foreign
intelligence and diplomatic services. Most anticipate that ISI will attempt
to maintain its historic control over any Afghan insurgents, and remain
the sole conduit between the Taliban and the outside world.
The Haqqani Network
The Haqqani Network is the largest of several, similarly-structured
Taliban groups operating in Afghanistan. It is based in Miram Shah,
Pakistan, and draws heavily on the populations of Khowst, Paktia and
Paktika Province, Afghanistan, for support. Though the Haqqani
Network maintains its own identity and history, it remains an integral
part of the Taliban.
Haqqani Network personnel changes, areas of responsibility, funding,
operations , and strategy are directed by the Taliban leadership in Quetta,
Pakistan. The Haqqani Network will not independently reconcile, nor are
they authorized to act as spokesmen for the Taliban as a whole. Haqqani
Network members refer to themselves only as Taliban. The term
Haqqani Network is unknown within the group.
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the group, gained a significant and
loyal following as a jihadist commander in the 1980s. During the civil
wars off the early 1990s, Jalaluddin haqqani acted as a mediator between
various belligerent groups, with mixed succcess. By 1996, on the
promise that they Taliban would bring stability and Islamic governance
to Afghanistan, he swore allegiance to Mullah Mohammad Omar.
Detained members of Jalaluddin Haqqani's family have repeatedly
confirmed that his commitment of support was made willingly.
"First, I have a question for you. You must know
where we are every day in Pakistan, I'm sure.
Why are Badruddin [Haqqani Network
operational commander] and I still alive?
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], Senior Haqqani Network
Commander, Khowst and Paktia Provinces
Jalaluddin Haqqani refused any senior position within the Taliban
government. Instead he accepted a relatively modest appointment as
Minister of Border Affairs, primarily so that he could retain an office in
his ancestral homeland. He provided commanders and fighters to the
Taliban government during the fight against the Northern Alliance and
remained loyal to Mullah Mohammad Omar even after the coalition
invasion in 2001.
Soon after the 2001 invasion, he encouraged close associates and tribal
leaders to reconnect with the interim government and explore options for
reintegration. This effort was disrupted when ISAF mistakenly bombed a
convoy of family members and tribal leaders in Paktia Province as they
traveled to a loya jirga meeting in Kabul to discuss forming a permanent
government. Despite this incident, Jalaluddin Haqqani permitted his
brothers Hajji Ibrahim and Hajji Khalil ur Rahman to work with
government officials in Kabul from 2002-2003, until they were arrested
by ISAF and ISI, respectively.
Jalaluddin Haqqani is reportedly alive, though descriptions of his
health and lucidity vary. His location is currently unknown and he
maintains little connectivity with relatives and associates. By most
accounts, Jalaluddin Haqqani provides occasional advice to Haqqani
Network leaders, but he no longer maintains operational control over the
group. Jalaluddin Haqqani's death will likely be well-publicized, as he
retains a wide base of popular support in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Sirajuddin, Jalaluddin Haqqani's second son, was appointed to take
control of the group in approximately 2005, and continued his father's
commitment to support the Taliban. A wide range of detainees have
described Sirajuddin as quiet, serene, pious, compassionate, highly
intelligent, reclusive and intensely devoted to jihad. Nasiruddin, the
eldest son, is competent and loyal, but not interested in personally
accepting the senior leadership position. Nasiruddin instead represents
Sirajuddin in meetings with ISI in Islamabad, Pakistan, and the Taliban
Central Shura in Quetta, Pakistan. Nasiruddin also handles Haqqani
Network finances, including the delivery of funds from the Taliban
leadership.
Because Sirajuddin remains in hiding, his younger brother Badruddin
coordinates all military operations for the Haqqani Network. The group
has become highly centralized around Badruddin, and very little can
occur without his knowledge and consent. Badruddin coordinates the
distribution of materiel for supordinate commanders, and oversees all
suicide operations and large-scale attacks. Badruddin's pattern of life is
highly regimented, and he travels each day between several known
locations in Miram Shah, Pakistan.
Sirajuddin's location is generally unknown, and even senior
commanders sometimes require several days to arrange a face-to-face
meeting. The Taliban leadership appointed Sirajuddin governor of
Khowst Province. Mullah Sangin, a close associate of the Haqqani
family, is the govenror of Paktika Province. Outside of these areas,
Sirajuddin has numerous subordinate commanders assigned to conduct
operations in Paktia, Logar, Ghazni, Wardak, Kunduz, Baghlan , and
Takhar provinces, under the operational command of other Taliban
governors.
The Haqqani Madrassa
Familial Residence and Meeting Location for
Haqqani Network Senior Leadership
[SA TELLITE MAP RED A CTEDJ
//[redacted]//
North Waziristan Agency, PK
The Haqqani Network also conducts most of the Taliban's large-scale
attacks in the Kabul area. The Taliban leadership designated Kabul City
a "free area," in which any commander con conduct operations without
prior coordination with the local command. Badruddin and Zakir, a
Haqqani Network subordinate commander with extensive ties to foreign
fighter networks and militant groups in Northern Afghanistan, have taken
a leading role in arranging attacks in the capital. The area surrounding
Miram Shah, Pakistan, is home to a wide range of disparate militant
groups. Personnel, expertise and materiel are readily available to suit any
operation. The Haqqani Network has become adept at combining efforts
and utilizing available resources in order to orchestrate spectacular
attacks.
Mullah Mohammad Omar considers Sirajuddin one of his most
effective commanders, and the two maintain regular correspondence,
typically through a series of couriers, including Nasiruddin Haqqani and
an unidentified brother of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Mullah
Mohammad Omar has specifically noted Sirajuddin Haqqani's ability to
continually carry out high-profile, large-scale attacks and assassinations,
which generate significant international media attention for the Taliban.
The Haqqani Network remains the only significant Afghan Taliban
group to have conducted military operations against Pakistan. Deceased
Tehrik-e Taliban (TT) leader Baitullah Mehsud began his jihadist career
as a low-level Haqqani Network commander under now-detained senior
leader Hajji Mali Khan. Baitullah Mehsud remained in the Haqqani
Network until approximately 2007, when he restructured his subordinate
personnel and redirected all efforts against Pakistan. This garnered him
unprecedented regional support. Numerous Haqqani-affiliated
commanders, including Hajji Mali Khan and Mullah Sangin, were often
inspired to covertly fight alongside Baitullah Mehsud against the
Pakistani military.
The ISI association with the Haqqani Network is highly secretive, and
it can often be difficult to differentiate rumors from fact. ISI has exerted
particularly tight control over the Haqqani family, likely as a result of
Haqqani Network leaders' reportedly deep resentment of the Government
of Pakistan. Even senior Haqqani Network personnel lament Pakistan's
influence over Sirajuddin. However, most acknowledge that there is
currently no choice but to accept at least a certain degree of ISI control,
in exchange for the sanctuary they provide. ISI has repeatedly arrested
senior Haqqani Network personnel without warning or apparent cause,
all while privately touting the fact that Haqqani Network leaders are
permitted free movement in Pakistan. Most of the Haqqani Network
leadership assumes that this policy is simply another of Pakistan's
methods for asserting its control.
Sirajuddin and Badruddin have held meetings directly with ISI
personnel. However, most communication is handled through Haqqani
family members Hajji Ibrahim, Hajji Khalil ur Rahman and Nasiruddin
Haqqani. ISI appears to view its liaison with the Haqqani Network as a
back channel means of communication to other militant groups in North
Waziristan, as well as a tool for tailoring insurgent strategy to more
closely match the goals of Pakistan.
Detainees have provided little credible evidence of Pakistan directly
funding, training or equipping Haqqani Network personnel. As in other
cases of ISI-Taliban cooperation, the relationship appears to focus on
maintaining overarching Pakistani direction of the Afghan insurgency.
As in many of its other relationships, ISI employs a delicately balanced
combination of coercion and support to keep the Haqqani Network under
its control.
Taliban Finances
The Taliban continue to openly raise the majority of their revenue
through donations. Collectors travel door to door throughout Pakistan
requesting donations, without disguising their Taliban affiliation. Most
donations are provided under the official title of zakat, or religious
tithing, but the eventual use of the donation for jihad is clear. Donors
range from wealthy businessmen to impoverished families, and the
amount donated is typically determined as a percentage of available
income at the time. Taliban collections regularly take place throughout
the year, in every city in Pakistan.
Donors from the Gulf Region also provide funds to support Taliban
efforts, though this process is far more secretive. Taliban members find it
difficult to travel commercially and any decision to do so must be made
assuming the visibility of Pakistani ISI and other national intelligence
services. Detainees have described fundraising efforts in the Gulf Region
as being under the guise of either religious donations or venture capital,
ostensibly to fund Afghan entrepreneurs. These funds are typically
transferred via courier or through independent money transfer
establishments known as hawalas. Taliban leaders have virtually no
direct involvement with traditional banking systems.
"This year, more funds were given to
the Taliban to conduct operations than
in any previous year. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], commission chief,
Parwan Province
Assessing the legitimacy of such funds transfers can be extremely
difficult. As with most Taliban financial transactions, funds are
transferred in small amounts, typically under $10,000.00. To further
complicate matters, Afghan and Pakistani expatriates working
throughout the Gulf Region generate a continuous, yet legitimate flow of
currency back to family members at home. This can lead to additional
confusion over what is or is not insurgent-related. Many detainees have
pointed out that even legitimate financial transactions between family
members or businesses may later be donated, at least in part, to insurgent
organizations.
Donations are also collected throughout Afghanistan. Under Section 12
of the La'iha, the Taliban are not permitted to use criminal activities,
such as forcibly collecting zakat or hijacking and kidnapping for ransom.
Taliban personnel accused of stealing from local civilians or kidnapping
for ransom are quickly replaced. In 201 1, there were numerous cases of
Taliban expelling their own personnel for perceived corruption. The
capture of materiel destined for Coalition bases is specifically noted as
an exception to this policy, though the eventual disposition of captured
goods and currency is strictly controlled under Section 5 of the La'iha.
"We collect from Afghans everywhere. There
are even a thousand Afghan homes in Dubai,
all of whom donate what they can to the
cause. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], senior Taliban financier
The narcotics trade provides funds to Taliban operations, though the
nature of this process is widely misunderstood. The Taliban does not
officially encourage or discourage narcotics production, and it does not
play any direct role in the farming, smuggling, refining or distribution
process. However, the Taliban regularly collects a percentage of zakat
from any individual involved in any stage of narcotics production. This
zakat may be collected in Afghanis, Pakistani rupees or, frequently, raw
opium or hashish.
Yearly throughout Afghanistan, during the spring harvest, raw opium
becomes a form of currency. The opium is openly traded in any of the
hundreds of narcotics bazaars which emerge at that time, usually away
from population centers under government control. In the event that the
Taliban commander receives a portion of the zakat in raw opium, he will
send an associated to the local bazaar to exchange it for the monetary
equivalent. This money, along with other donations collected from local
residents, is then used to purchase motorcycle fuel, phone cards,
ammunition or other sundry items used to maintain Taliban operations in
that area.
More significant equipment such as vehicles, various small arms, 107
mm rockets, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles or specialized
ammunition typically require additional finances from higher-level
commanders who are based in Pakistan. This is often a point of
contention, as funds are not always available to meet the lower-level
commander's operational needs. Lower-level Taliban commanders often
find it easier to replace personnel than equipment.
Tactics involving direct- fire attacks using small arms are often used
sparingly in order to minimize equipment losses. Mines, fertilizer,
detonation cord, blasting caps, remote detonators and other elements
related specifically to IED operations are delivered free of charge from
the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. Taliban personnel endure far fewer
losses in personnel and materiel by focusing on IED operations.
In 201 1, a wide variety of detainees discussed Taliban finances. As a
rule, district commanders receive between $50,000 and $200,000 per
year, depending on the level of insurgent activity in their area. The
Taliban regional military commissions in Pakistan apportion funds to
each province, and the Taliban provincial governor then distributes his
allotment to his subordinate district commanders. Based on only detainee
estimates, the Taliban appears to require between $100 million and $150
million per year to operate. Detainees often note their ability to operate
effectively with minimal resources, without the yearly multi-billion-
dollar budgets of GIRoA security forces.
Almost without exception, Taliban members do not receive salaries or
other financial incentives for their work. Low-level fighters and
facilitators who live and operate in Afghanistan must keep their jobs in
order to maintain an adequate income for themselves and their families.
Commanders at the district or provincial level tend to suffer financially.
However, any commander who is forced to leave Afghanistan and
resettle in Pakistan receives a stipend to assist in renting a house for his
family. Normally, even these commanders must request donations from
other family members in order to subsist.
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations
In direct combat, most Taliban commanders understand that they
simply cannot compete with ISAF. Direct confrontation frequently leads
to staggering losses of Taliban personnel. Despite these losses, however,
commander such as Mullah Sangin in Paktika Province, Badruddin
Haqqani in Khowst Province and numerous others in Southern
Afghanistan will occasionally engage in large-scale direct attacks. These
attacks are often combined with indirect fire and suicide operations to
maximize psychological impact. Though these attacks are tactically
ineffective, they garner widespread media attention, generate interest and
commendation from the Taliban senior leadership and actually bolster
recruiting and fundraising efforts.
Taliban leaders anticipate personnel losses. Commanders and fighters
are easily replaced, at least initially, with minimal impact on operations.
After eliminating a commander, ISAF will often switch focus to other
areas and targeting lines. While this type of targeting may remove
specific insurgents from the battlefield, it will typically have a negligible
effect on insurgent operations overall.
"After the next guy, [the District
Commander] Mualawi Zahir was
killed, we just left to go back to
Pakistan. The airstrikes and the
raids at night were too much.
[Photo redacted]
—[name redacted], IMU Deputy
Commander, Kunduz Province
Taliban commanders are most fearful of precise, yet persistent
targeting. Unrelenting, pinpoint ISAF operations targeting specific
command elements have had a demonstrable effect on the insurgents'
ability to conduct operations. Because Taliban provincial governors tend
to remain in Pakistan, beyond the scope of ISAF operations, the most
striking results appear to be derived from successive targeting of Taliban
personnel at the district command level.
When a Taliban district commander is captured or killed, he is replaced
within hours by his deputy. If ISAF can quickly remove the deputy, a
senior commander from the district typically takes his place and a new
deputy must be chosen. This leads to an inevitable rippling effect
throughout the local insurgent chain of command as leaders are selected
for promotion.
When that replacement commander is killed or captured, insurgent
operations in the area often cease, at least temporarily, in order to
reshuffle the chain of command and resolve any perceived operational
security issues. This often leads to infighting, mistrust and accusatory
behavior which, by Taliban regulations, must be resolved at the
commission level in Pakistan. Though even these networks will
eventually reconstitute, the process can disable a Taliban district
command for weeks or months. In the spring or early summer, at the
beginning of the fighting season, this sustained targeting can be
particularly disruptive.
The targeting of facilitation networks has also had a demonstrable
effect on Taliban operations. IEDs are most often constructed inside
Afghanistan. Various materials such as fertilizer, blasting caps and
detonation cord are not widely available and must be smuggled in from
Pakistan, often in large quantities, for use over an extended period of
time. Insurgents have frequently indicated that large interdictions
severely limited their ability to conduct operations in their area. After
losing large quantities of materials, senior commanders are forced to
redistribute the limited available resources, often leading to internal
disagreements and other organizational inefficiencies.
Coordination of targeting and strategic information operations
messaging increases ISAF effectiveness. For example, the continued
presence of foreign elements in Afghanistan can be publicized as a clear
hindrance to eventual ISAF withdrawals. Continuous ISF operations
specifically targeting foreign fighters in a particular area can greatly
amplify this messaging. In instances when ISAF operations and
messaging have been synchronized, the population has been more liable
to appreciate and support allied operations. In the past, such operations
have not only removed key personnel from the battlefield, but forced the
Taliban to adapt their strategy, by severely restricting their use of foreign
personnel.
Targeting tribal elders, religious leaders, shopkeepers, laborers and
others with nominal contact with Taliban personnel can foster deep
resentment and mistrust of ISAFand GIRoA. It is increasingly difficult
for civilians in much of Afghanistan to completely avoid contact with
Taliban personnel. It can often be a challenge to differentiate between
local civilians who have contact with insurgents and members of the
Taliban who act in a facilitation role.
Villagers commonly relay that the Taliban are continually present in
their areas solving disputes, purchasing supplies at local bazaars, meeting
with tribal leaders or staying overnight in guesthouses or the local
mosque. They take exception to being arrested for this type of contact.
Throughout Afghanistan, under established cultural norms, a homeowner
is obliged to provide overnight accommodation to passersby without
question.
Large-scale conventional operations can also have a negative strategic
effect. While these operations can initially produce a certain degree of
stability, the imposition of GIRoA governance often leads to widespread
dissatisfaction, resentment and a long-term upsurge in support for
insurgents. Unlike large-scale operations, pinpoint raids and kinetic
strikes on confirmed militants can usually be explained and understood
locally, particularly when few civilians are beleaguered in the process.
ISAF personnel are not nearly as disliked as Afghan security forces,
and ISAF is not burdened with the GIRoA reputation for corruption,
ethnic bias or favoritism in local disputes. However, ISAF cordon and
searches, counterdrug operations or mass detentions quickly generate
sympathy for the insurgency and lead to a hostile environment for both
ISAF and GIRoA personnel. Taliban commanders reported intentionally
goading ISAF and Afghan forces into conducting such operations, or
deliberately luring ISAF into arresting tribal and religious leaders only to
meet with angry locals afterward in order to express sympathy and
bolster support for the Taliban.
The Pakistani Taliban
The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban, is a
conglomeration of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, Central Asian
extremists, Al Qaeda affiliates and former Punjabi militant groups, some
with experience in Kashmir. TTP continues to conduct operations
throughout the tribal areas of Pakistan, with particular emphasis on South
Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand and several strategic regions within the
Northwest Frontier Province.
However, since the death of TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud in 2009,
TTP strength and influence has waned considerably. The Government of
Pakistan has developed an innovative strategy for subduing the TTP
through a combination of clandestine diplomacy and intense military
action. ISI has directed much of its effort toward undermining the TTP
from within, and subsequently redirecting insurgent efforts away from
Pakistan. TTP commander Hakimullah Mehsud remains a polarizing,
unpredictable and emotional leader, a fact which is easily exploited and
manipulated by ISI.
In South Waziristan Agency, a historic base of operations for TTP,
full-scale warfare between TTP and Pakistan military forces continues
daily. Both sides have endured significant losses in the conflict. Pakistani
artillery and airpower are employed regularly, often indiscriminately, in
an effort to root out insurgents. Alliances among ISI, Afghan Taliban,
tribal elements and various other militants in South Waziristan are in
constant fluctuation, making it difficult to ascertain the ground truth of
the situation. Many senior TTP personnel have fled into North
Waziristan Agency, where the Pakistani government does not conduct
operations.
Gul Bahader, the TTP-affiliated emir for North Waziristan, abides by a
mutual ceasefire agreement he made with ISI, which bans all offensive
operations in the agency. Gul Bahader is considered one of the most
powerful commanders in Pakistan's tribal areas, with dozens of senior
sub-commanders and thousands of fighters under his command. ISI has
persuaded Gul Bahader to support operations exclusively in Afghanistan,
which he accomplishes by temporarily assigning his personnel to work
under Afghan Taliban commanders, typically of the Haqqani Network.
The ceasefire in North Waziristan is a significant point of contention
between Gul Bahader and Hakimullah Mehsud. Against the explicit
orders of Gul Bahader and local Afghan Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud
continues to attempt to provoke the Pakistani government into breaking
the agreement. Many believe that this discord will eventually lead to
open conflict between TTP and remaining North Waziristan-based
militant groups. This serves the strategic interests of Pakistan by keeping
belligerents focused on each other, degrading TTP in the process.
An example of TTP provocation was the videotaped execution of
Colonel Imam, a close associate and confidant of former ISI director
Hamid Gul. Colonel Imam was Hamid Gul's liaison to numerous militant
groups throughout Pakistan and, like Hamid Gul, he was a historic
proponent of Afghan Taliban, Kashmiri militants and Al Qaeda. TTP
ostensibly captured and killed Colonel Imam because he was a symbol of
ISI collaboration with insurgent groups, a notion which Hakimullah
Mehsud finds reprehensible. This execution prompted a significant
outcry from other militant group leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani,
who saw Hakimullah Mehsud's actions as pointlessly provocative.
While the Pakistani military applies intense pressure to the most
belligerent TTP elements, ISI has had demonstrable and consistent
success in approaching and pacifying mid-level TTP commanders. In
Bajaur Agency, Swat and Chitral, ISI has methodically split the TTP and
their collaborators into a series of disparate and uncoordinated subgroups
and redirected their operations into Afghanistan. An example of this is
Harakat ul-Jihad-e-Islami, a TTP-affiliated group formerly led by
deceased Al Qaeda-associated militant Ilyas Kashmiri. HUJI now
primarily supports Al Qaeda and Taliban personnel in Konar and
Nuristan provinces, Afghanistan.
Despite a mutual aversion to ISI and the Government of Pakistan, TTP
continues to alienate even formerly sympathetic Afghan Taliban
personnel. TTP remains notorious for its brutality, which is widely seen
as counterproductive to long-term efforts and arguably contrary to the
teachings of Islam. TTP attempts to disrupt the relationship between ISI
and Afghan insurgents are viewed as impetuous and impractical. Even
deceased Al Qaeda operations chief Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was vocal in
his condemnation of TTP brutality, to the point that he threatened a split
between Al Qaeda and TTP over the issue.
Haqqani Network and other Afghan Taliban groups are often resentful
of the TTP/A1 Qaeda North Waziristan-based counter-intelligence
element, or Khorasan Group, for their often overzealous efforts to find,
question and execute suspected spies. The Khorasan Group has already
executed hundreds in North Waziristan Agency, Pakistan, many with
insubstantial evidence. Many militants assume that without significant
changes to the TTP leadership and tactics, the organization will likely
continue to lose supporters, and increasingly attract outcasts and criminal
elements.
Relationships with Foreign Fighters
The deaths of Usama bin Laden, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Abu Hafs al-
Shahri, Ilyas Kashmiri, the Yemen leadership and other commandrs,
fighters and technical experts have combined to severely cripple Al
Qaeda's ability to operate. Ayman al Zawahiri is now the senior leader of
Al Qaeda. Abu Yahya al Libi, his deputy, maintains more direct
interaction with residual operational elements. In the past, numerous
detainees described Abu Yahya as well-versed in Salafist religious
doctrine, but not particularly proficient as a commander or strategist.
It has become increasingly difficult for Al Qaeda to maintain a base of
operations in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The constant fear of airstrikes,
internal conspirators and spies, and severe restrictions on lifestyle are
highly demoralizing. Newly arrived Al Qaeda fighters become
discouraged quickly at the scrutiny placed upon them by overly
suspicious leaders. Fighters are also frustrated by the fact that they are
rendered inactive, untrained, sequestered into safehouses and denied
communication with the outside world, sometimes for months at a time.
Many former Al Qaeda personnel have left the group to work alongside
other militant groups.
"Al Qaeda cannot trust the Pashtuns. They do not
conduct joint operations. The Pashtuns only trust
313 Brigade because we are all Punjabi, with no
connections to Afghanistan. "
"We are only safe in Konar and Nuristan because
[ISAFJ is too intimidated by the terrain to do
operations there. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted], HUJI 313 Brigade Operativ,
Bajaur Agency, Pakistan and Konar Province,
Afghanistan
In most regions of Afghanistan, Taliban leaders have no interest in
associating with Al Qaeda. Working with Al Qaeda invites targeting, and
Al Qaeda personnel are no longer the adept and versatile fighters and
commanders they once were. Even Taliban groups with historically close
ties to Al Qaeda, such as the Haqqani Network, have had little or no
interaction with them in the last two years. Because the Afghan Taliban
largely will not sponsor them, Al Qaeda leaders have been forced to seek
other groups, such as TTP, for assistance and sanctuary. TTP and Al
Qaeda are now interdependent to the point that many detainees consider
them the same organization.
Northeastern Afghanistan has become a small haven for Al Qaeda.
Several Al Qaeda commanders, including the Al Qaeda emir for Konar
and Nuristan, Farouq al-Qahtani, now live and operate in Afghanistan,
with permission from the Taliban, but with the direct support of TTP
elements. Al Qaeda, TTP and Afghan Taliban work and train in both
provinces, though limited Al Qaeda efforts to expand operations from the
region have faltered due to a lack of support and sponsorship.
The Al Qaeda presence in this region is an anomaly from the rest of
Afghanistan for several reasons. There are almost no ISAF operations in
Nuristan Province, where Farouq al-Qahtani and his subordinates
reportedly reside. There is also relatively little ISAF activity in Konar
Province, though Taliban, TTP and Al Qaeda elements regularly conduct
offensive operations there. Furthermore, the situation in neighboring
Pakistan's Bajaur Agency and Northwest Frontier Province remains
unpredictable and dangerous for Al Qaeda and TTP elements who have
not yet reconciled with the Government of Pakistan. This has led some
TTP and Al Qaeda elements to seek refuge in Afghanistan, in order to
regroup, train and sustain operations to whatever extent possible.
Konar and Nuristan Provinces are also home to a large percentage of
Afghanistan's Salafist population, which has historically been
sympathetic to Arabs and Al Qaeda. Anti-government Salafist militias
have maintained a delicate yet necessary working relationship with their
Taliban counterparts, who are mostly Hanifi. The Salafis are also
historically more supportive of TTP, which allows TTP commanders the
ability to reach out to them for support when the security situation in
Pakistan becomes untenable.
Farsi-speaking members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) operate regularly under Taliban command in the North of
Afghanistan, and occasionally alongside Haqqani Network personnel in
Paktika and Paktia Provinces. Ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazaks, Azeris and
Turks continue to constitute the bulk of foreign fighters flowing into
Pakistan, typically through facilitation networks in Iraqn. The Iranians
have not historically supported Taliban elements or their allies directly.
However, they are generally willing to overlook political differences and
transiting personnel in order to continue efforts against ISAF. Many of
these incoming fighters avoid Al Qaeda, and instead find refuge among
other groups, such as Taliban, TTP or IMU.
"In Berlin, this seemed like a good
idea. But, when I got to Iran, (the
AQ/Uzbek facilitator] told me to just
be a suicide bomber in Chechnya,
because fighting in Afghanistan was
going to be a waste of time. I should
have listened. "
[photo redacted]
—[name redacted],
Moroccan/German foreign fighter,
Zabul Province, Afghanistan
The Iranians have provided moderate support to what coalition forces
refer to as the Herat Insurgent Faction, or "Mujahedin of Martyr Akbari",
which is a smaller insurgent group operating primarily in Herat and
Badghis Provinces. However, Iran has offered far more support to Farsi-
speaking groups, many of which currently support GIRoA, rather than
pro-Taliban elements. Iran continues to indicate that it would be
interested in establishing a better relationship with the Taliban. There is
significant resistance to this from the Taliban leadership and ISI.
Thoughts on Reconciliation
Many Afghans believe that, despite public statements to the contrary,
the present GIRoA administration will never be truly interested in
allowing the Taliban a meaningful role in the government. The northern,
Farsi-speaking tribesmen who control the majority of GIRoA have little
to gain from increased Pashtun influence that the Taliban appears to
represent. The Taliban uses the flow of investments into Kabul from
nations around the world, including Iran, India and other states, as
evidence that GIRoA leaders are simply becoming wealthier by
deliberately prolonging the war.
The appointment of Burhanuddin Rabbani as Commissioner of the
High Council for Peace was taken as an enormous insult by many
Pashtuns. This is largely due to his status as the former head of the
interim mujahedin government and president of the Northern Alliance,
when he developed a widespread reputation for his partiality toward
Farsi-speaking tribesmen. Because of the reputation he developed during
that period, Burhannudin Rabbani was considered a war criminal
internationally and by much of the Afghan population, to include many
non-Pashtuns.
There is a widespread belief that Rabbani's appointment was President
Hamid Karzai's deliberate attempt to simultaneously convince the world
that he wnted peace while letting the Pashtuns know that he did not. The
potential appointment of Rabbani's son, Ahmad Zia Massoud, to take his
father's position will have an equally provocative effect on the Taliban
and much of the Pashtun population.
Reconciliation is simply not a realistic option for most Taliban
commanders. ISAF and GIRoA have demanded the surrender of
weapons and a pledge of allegiance to the Afghan constitution as a
prerequisite for reconciliation. Both requirements remain highly
objectionable to most Taliban leaders. In historically Pashtun areas of
Afghanistan, where popular support for the Taliban is at its highest,
reconciliation is viewed as shameful and, perhaps more importantly,
unnecessary, due to the largely unabated expansion of Taliban influence.
The most successful efforts to reconcile Taliban commanders have
occurred in the North of Afghanistan, in provinces which historically
have had less of a Taliban presence. Sar-e Pul, Baghlan, Samangan and
Badghis provinces have had legitimate cases of Taliban commanders
reconciling. The Taliban tend to assign less-experienced commanders to
northern provinces. These commanders tend to receive far less funding
and replacements than other areas. Morale is lower, and the local Pashtun
populations in these areas tend to be smaller, making recruitment and
local fundraising more of a challenge.
For the Taliban leadership, independent talks with other nations or
entities, to include the U.S. and GIRoA, remain extremely difficult.
There is significant pressure and influence from ISI not to consider
reconciliation. Taliban commanders who lay down arms or swear
allegiance to support the Afghan constitution have been targeted for
retribution.
Taliban Reconciliation Programs
The Taliban have publicly relayed their intention to include all Afghan
tribes, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashai and Pashtuns in their
efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. This message has clearly not yet resonated
among northerners. There are widespread fears in the north that, despite
such reassurances, if the Taliban eventually gains influence in Kabul
they will be unable to control their subordinates and prevent violence.
Many Taliban members suffered through widespread atrocities during
the conflict against the Northern Alliance, and again after the coalition
invasion of 2001. This has not been forgotten. Those in the north who
fear an eventual Taliban takeover are eager to avoid any possibility of
violent retribution. Many have begun preparing for this eventuality by
arming and training militias. Others are seeking alternative methods of
ensuring their safety. The last year brought a dramatic increase in
detainee reporting regarding Taliban efforts to "reconcile" government
and security forces to the insurgent side.
Taliban personnel anticipate that ISAF will continue to pull out of
Afghanistan, region by region, leaving Afghan forces behind to maintain
security. The Taliban have adapted their strategy to hasten ISAF
withdrawals as much as possible, to include reducing the level of
violence in certain areas. Once ISAF is no longer a factor, Taliban
consider their victory inevitable. The Taliban are absolutely confident in
their ability to subdue Afghan forces.
Enemy Documents, 2011
Objective ABP Xfer
Khowst Province, AF:
[Taliban letterhead, "Afghanistan Islamic
Emirate"in Pashto and English, and a
handwritten note, redacted, with English
translation below that:]
...Peace be Upon You,
As you know, the District Governor and his
colleague, NDS Chief Islam, have
coordinated with the Taliban to ambush the
Americans and Police.
This is good news, because we are trying to
obtain cooperation from all the government to
helv vou beat the Westerners ...
Taliban commanders have already altered their strategy to allow for a
more rapid handover to GIRoA forces. Guidance from Mullah
Mohammad Omar in the summer of 201 1 directed that no Taliban
element will engage ISAF forces as they withdraw. Throughout Helmand
Province, even in heavily-contested areas such as Marja District, Taliban
governance appears to remain in effect. Detainees already report
widespread insurgent cooperation with Afghan forces. Most Taliban
commanders there, however, relocated to northern Helmand, where they
have attempted to regroup and avoid direct confrontation with ISAF
personnel. This move is largely for self-preservation, as they attempt to
outlast ISAF in the area.
Throughout Afghanistan, formal and informal agreements between
Taliban, Arbakai militias and Afghan intelligence, police and army units
have long been a common occurrence. An official Taliban reconciliation
program appears to have been implemented in the summer of 201 1. It is
designed to reach out to GIRoA officials and enablers, in order to garner
official commitments to support the Taliban in the long term. For the
first time, detainees report the use of officially signed ceasefire and
loyalty agreements. These agreements are the first formal recognition of
the process from the Taliban side, and they have already seen some
success.
Agreements with local Afghan units are most often of a passive nature,
informal ceasefires are common and, in many regions, the norm for
Afghan forces, there has been a conspicuous increase in reporting which
references outright coordination, equipment transfers, intelligence
sharing or occasionally even the incorporation of Afghan security forces
into Taliban operations, some of whom have already targeted ISAF
personnel.
The weapons bazaar in Miram Shah, Pakisan, is increasingly inundated
with rifles, pistols and heavy weapons which have been sold by Afghan
security forces. Captured photographs of Taliban personnel riding openly
in the green Ford Ranger pickup trucks of the Afghan Army are
commonplace throughout Afghanistan. These vehicles and weapons were
once only acquired on the battlefield. They are now regularly sold or
donated by Afghan security forces.
"In Konar Province, Afghan intelligence,
Afghan police and the Afghan army all
work with us now. "
[Photo Redacted]
—[name redacted] , Al Qaeda-affiliated
TTP operative, Bajaur Agency, Pakistan,
and Konar Province, Afghanistan
Overall contact between Taliban and GIRoA leaders also appears to
have increased in the last two years. Most Taliban commanders with
GIRoA connections report that the relationships began with Afghan
officials reaching out to the Taliban, not vice versa. Small, yet
quantifiable gestures of support are provided as evidence of the GIRoA
official's interest in cooperation. Most often, these gestures involve
leaking intelligence on ISAF operations, guarantees of safe passage,
early warning on impending arrests or assistance in releasing captured
insurgents in Afghan custody, without the customary bribe.
The nature of any long-term ISAF commitment to Afghanistan
remains a fundamental question for the Taliban. ISAF remains a serious
threat, and most insurgents believe that the continued presence of ISAF
personnel will at least delay the Taliban's anticipated return to power.
Yet, there is recognition that ISAF will not stay indefinitely. In the
interim, the Taliban will continue to encourage informal peace deals at
the local level.
Explaining ISAF Goals
While ISAF strategic messaging has improved noticeably over the last
two years, a large degree of confusion among the population remains
over ISAF goals. Despite 10 years of conflict, many have surprisingly
little concept of what ISAF intends to accomplish or, perhaps most
importantly, what insurgents will need to do in order to end the war.
Very few in Afghanistan equate the current situation to Iraq where
insurgents turned against Al Qaeda elements, fostering an atmosphere
conducive to coalition troop withdrawals. Detainees continue to relay
varying impressions of the ISAF mission, and most assume that ISAF is
in Afghanistan to accomplish one or more of the following:
--Kill or capture Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders
--Impose democracy and Western ideals
—Install and continue to support pro-US GIRoA leaders
--Insure that Pashtuns do not return to power in Kabul
--Acquire Afghanistan's resources
--Use Afghanistan as a base to intimidate neighbors, such as China and
Iran
--Continue a worldwide crusade against Muslims
In reality, ISAF goals are fundamentally reasonable and, at least in
face-to-face discussions, easily explainable. Clarification on exactly what
ISAF expects from the conflict is frequently a first step to reaching
genuine cooperation and understanding. The primary ISAF goal remains
denying Afghanistan as a future safe haven for international extremists.
A secondary goal is to responsibly leave Afghanistan under the control
of Afghans, without the appearance that bloody civil war is imminent.
In order to encourage talks with Taliban leaders, it is often necessary to
appear reluctantly prepared for indefinite war. Many Taliban leaders
believe that ISAF will leave Afghanistan even if no compromise can be
reached. In order to maintain a certain degree of leverage, it is important
to relay a sense of unpredictability and commitment to the fight, despite
the inherent cost, simply because the original cause remains valid.
In detainee operations, a variety of messages resonate particularly well
among Afghan insurgents. The following themes have assisted in
achieving greater understanding of the ISAF mission, and encourage
insurgents more toward dialogue than continued violence:
--Our mission is to protect our families at home. The war was begun by
belligerents who sought conflict and perpetuated by us only in self-
defense. This cause is righteous and understandable in any religion or
culture.
--In no way is ISAF in Afghanistan to dishonor Islam, take natural
resources, forsake traditional culture or establish a base to spread
Western influence in the region.
—The plan for the war was made over a few weeks in September and
October of 2001. We made necessarily quick decisions and, of course,
many mistakes since our arrival. Now, though, it is important to focus on
the future.
—The death of Usama bin Laden and the continued degradation of Al
Qaeda have already directly enabled more concerted efforts to withdraw
from Afghanistan.
--GIRoA clearly needs help from all of the Afghan people. We need to
focus on finding long-term solutions and promoting inclusion.
Everything is on the table.
—ISAF cannot leave in good conscience if a bloody civil war appears
imminent. There must eventually be some dialogue between the major
participants.
--The Taliban must be prepared to say and do whatever is necessary to
ease Northern fears, if they want to hasten the end of the war.
—GIRoA will accept negotiations and approach them earnestly, or risk
appearing to be belligerents in the conflict and losing international
support.
--Pakistan will eventually have no option but to accept the will of the
Afghan people.
—The nations of ISAF are universally prepared to stay or return if
international extremism reemerges as an issue in Afghanistan.
--The last time the U.S. lost 3,000 men and women in a surprise attack,
we willingly suffered the loss of 450,000 additional personnel to end the
threat. While we have no desire whatsoever to repeat this, the safely of
our families at home justifies any loss.
—Extremist agendas, which promote the notion that only violence can
achieve political goals, should be rendered invalid given the Arab
uprisings of 201 1.
--The Hadith explains how the Prophet Mohammad overruled the advice
of many of his closest lieutenants and made significant compromises to
insure the success of negotiations leading to the peace of Houdaibia,
which ended the war between the early Muslims and the Qureshi tribe.
—It is stated in the Koran, in Sura 8, that while a group must be prepared
for a righteous war, it must accept offers of peace, even in the case that
the enemy is deemed untrustworthy.
--An end to 35 years of war should be of interest to every nation in the
region.
Thoughts on Negotiations
Direct negotiations with ISAF appear to be of interest to Taliban senior
leaders, particularly if the negotiations promise to lead to their eventual
return to Afghanistan. However, there has been little faith that ISAF will
seriously consider Taliban concerns, provide sufficient guarantees of
safely and secrecy, or keep to established goals. Many also fear that
GIRoA or ISI will surreptitiously derail any talks, simply because each
seeks to perpetuate the war for its own benefit.
At least currently, there is little or no interest among the Taliban
leadership in direct negotiations with GIRoA.GIRoA is not yet seen as an
honest broker, and the Taliban anticipates that GIRoA will initially issue
deliberately unreasonable demands in order to prevent progress. Many
GIRoA leaders have already announced publicly that there will never
again be a Taliban government in Afghanistan and issued pledges to
continue the war until the Taliban surrender.
Taliban leaders, who consistently believe that GIRoA is more likely to
eventually surrender, tend to take these statements as threats and pledge
to continue the fight themselves. Nonetheless, despite this outward
posturing, Taliban leaders appear to recognize that talks with GIRoA
may eventually become a necessity to facilitate the withdrawal of ISAF.
Such talks would demonstrate to the international community there is
genuine interest in resolving differences peacefully and avoiding civil
war.
There is an increasingly widespread belief that the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan will eventually change from counterinsurgency to
counterterrorism as troop levels are reduced and targeting becomes
gradually more limited to Al Qaeda and international extremists. Taliban
commanders also recognize the possibility of an eventual ISAF transition
into peacekeeping, security and diplomatic facilitation of GIRoA -
Taliban peace talks. Higher-level detainees suggest that the Taliban
leadership is likely to support this course of action.
The concepts of family, honor and justified war resonate particularly
well in Afghanistan. Even senior Taliban commanders frequently
become emotional when the events of 2001 are explained on a personal
level. These emotions can also be used to illustrate international unity in
mission. We often relay that citizens of nearly every nation in the world
displayed banners reading, "Today we are all Americans" after the 2001
attacks. Because the Taliban leadership has no defense on this issue, we
have repeatedly seen this theme lead to capitulation and compromise in
negotiations.
Higher level Taliban detainees have suggested that during
negotiations Taliban leaders will be primarily interested in discussing the
following:
--Accelerating the withdrawal of ISAF personnel from Afghanistan
—Maintaining initial secrecy from GIRoA and the Government of
Pakistan
--Recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate organization
--Addressing and overcoming initial concerns of regional neighbors such
as Pakistan
—Establishing ceasefires
—Trust building endeavors, such as increased dialogue, cross-border
meetings, tailored public messaging and prisoner releases
-Eventual inclusion of GIRoA in negotiations
-Breaking ties with Al Qaeda and international extremists
—The safe return of Taliban leaders to Afghanistan
—The nature and shape of a future Afghan government
-Ensuring rogue elements, on all sides, do not provoke a return to
violence
-Future posture of Afghan defense forces
—Future international relations and business ventures
-Monitoring, inspections and surveillance after ISAF withdrawals
Taliban personnel are fundamentally disinterested in the following:
—Immediate meetings with GIRoA
-Any appearance of surrender
—Forced disarmament
-Acceptance of a secondary position within the existing Afghan
government
-Swearing allegiance to Hamid Karzai, GIRoA or the Afghan
constitution
—Fundamental changes in viewpoint or significant social reforms
[including]: Western style women's rights; education for girls; forced
secularism; acceptance of "democracy", at least as it is currently
understood in Afghanistan.
Views on a Post-ISAF Afghanistan
Most Taliban personnel believe that if ISAF were to withdraw
immediately, it would prompt an abbreviated war with remaining GIRoA
elements, which would precipitate the Taliban returning to power.
Estimates for the length of this war range between two and 20 days, as
most expect the vast majority of standing Afghan security forces to
reconcile or flee long before any such war begins in earnest. Despite the
apparent optimism, many civilians agree with this assessment.
The potential for an indefinite ISAF presence is a concern to Taliban
leaders, but most assume that this prospect is not likely. Their principal
fear is the emergence of a reconstituted, post GIRoA Northern Alliance
and a bloody and protracted civil war for control of Northern
Afghanistan. Though many acknowledge that a northern particition could
actually avert a civil war, Taliban leaders do not support the notion of an
independent Northern Afghanistan.
This aversion to a separation appears to be nationalistic in nature. Most
do not view the north of the country as being overly wealthy, in
resources or infrastructure. There appears to be little concept of material
gain in the Taliban's insistence on unity. Taliban commanders
acknowledge that working with former enemies will be challenging, yet
they appear willing to accept inclusion, accompanied by inevitable
political disagreements, in lieu of war or partition.
Taliban leaders, many of whom fought in the last war against the
Northern Alliance, fear that the widely reported arms buildup in the
North is specifically in preparation for this contingency. Whereas a
future incarnation of the Northern Alliance may have the support of Iraq,
India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and possibly Russia, the Taliban will likely
only have the support of Pakistan. For the Taliban, who are hoping to
end the dependence on outsiders, and Pakistan in particular, this presents
a decidedly bleak prospect. Dependence on outside entities, similar to
what occurred prior to 2001, is something that the Taliban would prefer
to avoid.
The Taliban are becoming adept at handling local governance, which
has earned them widespread appeal. However, even senior commanders
privately doubt their ability to maintain the appaerance of incorruptibility
when handling the larger issues associated with national governance.
Most agree that the Taliban leadership did an inadequate job prior to
2001, and a future Taliban government should be much more
progressive, and take a greater interest in education and infrastructure.
While Taliban personnel appear confident in their ability to defeat
GIRoA, they privately express considerable trepidation when faced with
the possibility of accepting a future leading role in Afghanistan.
In Conclusion
If the war ended immediately, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban
leadership would rush to reestablish its relationship with Al Qaeda and
allow Afghanistan to once again become a training group for
international extremists. However, just as it was in the pre-9/1 1 era, a
protracted civil conflict will dramatically increase the chances of the
Taliban accepting assistance from any entity who will offer it. The
Taliban insist on significant changes to the current Afghan constitution,
dramatic changes in leadership and an end to GIRoA corruption. As the
Taliban have declared publicly, these details can be decided through
either discussions or the violent overthrow of the existing government.
In order to avoid the latter, both sides must be compelled to overcome
objections and at least attempt to begin the negotiation process. Taliban
personnel suggest that it may become necessary for ISAF to reassure
GIRoA leaders that inclusion is crucial for long-term stability. The
Taliban, alternatively, must be made to understand that meaningful
dialogue, a reduction of violence and clear distance from extremists will
hasten ISAF withdrawals.
Taliban leaders seem to agree that reducing violence and deeveloping a
sense of trust are prerequisites for progress. Numerous methods of
indirect communication can be utilized, including public addresses,
strategic detainee releases, unilateral ceasefires and the use of couriers,
such as tribal leaders, who unavoidably maintain contact with both sides.
All of these methods have been used effectively in the past. Numerous
detainees have noted during interrogations that this is the "only war in
Afghanistan's history with no real backchannel means of
communication."
Whether or not it is official, the Taliban throughout Afghanistan are
already working with GIRoA on the local level. In areas where ISAF has
withdrawn, Taliban influence has increased, often with little or no
resistance from government security forces. Low-level GIRoA
commanders reach out regularly to the Taliban to establish informal
ceasefires. These agreements, however unorthodox, reduce overall
violence and, for the moment, allow local populations at least
rudimentary governance. As long as the civilian population appears to
accept this, the situation is manageable. In the interim, ISAF will
obviously maintain the ability to resume offensive operations, should it
become necessary.
Though direct negotiations remain a challenge, and full-scale
reconciliation is highly unlikely, ISAF goals may still be met through
other, more indirect means. The Taliban may be receptive to meeting
demands even if formal talks are not held in the near term. Reassurances
from the Taliban that they have no intention of working with extremist
groups such as Al Qaeda, or fighting a war of retribution against Farsi-
speaking tribes of Afghanistan, are a positive first step. More tangible
guarantees while clearly necessary, may be negotiated once the security
situation improves.
The Taliban's faith in their ability to defeat GIRoA is irrelevant as long
as ISAF remains in Afghanistan. Even after major ISAF operations end
in Afghanistan, the threat of coalition forces returning will likely remain
potent. This may be the greatest source of leverage for ISAF, when
demanding compliance from the Taliban. After all, 1 years of war to
destroy one organizaton may in itself be enough to convince the Taliban
of the world's remarkable commitment to protecting its citizens from
terrorism.
SECRET//REL ISAF
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